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Minnesota Law Review Symposium Keynote
November 18, 2019

Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle
of Mass Incarceration
Rachel E. Barkow†
Thank you very much for having me. It’s wonderful to be
here and in particular to be talking about Frank Zimring’s book.1
I first met Frank shortly after I became a law professor. I don’t
know if you’ll remember this, Frank, but it’s in my mind quite
clearly. I was in awe. It was a panel at Columbia Law School, I
hadn’t been in teaching for very long, and I was going to be on a
panel with him. I was explaining the thesis of my paper, which
was an argument that fiscal changes in the states were going to
bring about bigger sentencing changes, and analyzing why they
wouldn’t happen at the federal level because they weren’t suffering from the same kind of cost constraints and the politics were
different.2 I gave my presentation, and then, when it was Frank’s
turn, he said that I was practicing social science without a license. So, Frank, I remain an unlicensed social science driver,
but I have nevertheless been asked to take the wheel again to
comment on both your book and, I hope, mine. Thankfully for
me, you do all the hard social science work in your draft and end
up backing up observations that I make in my own book, in
which I use more political economy and some of the politics and
existing research and data that’s out there on mass incarceration. But we reach many of the same conclusions, and even come
to many of the same proposed policies. So if a lawyer like me and
a social scientist like you end up in the same place, we’re either
† Vice Dean and Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy
and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, New York
University School of Law. Copyright © 2020 by Rachel E. Barkow.
1. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCARCERATION (forthcoming 2020).
2. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1296–97 (2005).
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both completely right or hopelessly wrong. But given your track
record, I think we’re right.
To set the stage for my remarks I want to start with the central point that Frank emphasizes in the draft of the book that I
suspect will remain the same. And I highly recommend it, because even in draft version it’s absolutely fantastic. One of the
things he emphasizes is that, for all the talk around criminal
justice reform in the United States and the emphasis that there’s
bipartisan movement to get things done, all the data and trends
instead point to us continuing to live with mass incarceration
and excessive criminalization in the United States for the foreseeable future.3 Frank explains in the book why there is so much
momentum for mass incarceration, and reminds us just how
modest the reforms we’ve seen so far have been.4
I’m kind of a glass-is-half-empty kind of person, and Frank’s
book gives me reason to be that way when it comes to criminal
justice reform. Although more than half the states have lowered
their incarceration rates, which is good, sixteen states report an
increase in the number of prisoners in 2016 as compared to
2007.5 Moreover, if we look at the states that have lowered their
prison populations, that decrease is actually pretty small when
you compare it to the prison buildup that took place before that.
There was an increase of seventy-seven percent between 1972
and 1981, but the decrease, from 2007 to 2016, was only about
seven percent.6 So that’s an eleven-to-one differential. So the
glass is actually eleven-twelfths empty. The overall decrease was
really driven by outliers like California, which was responsible
for reducing the number of prisoners—and I’m getting a lot of
these stats from Frank’s draft—by almost 44,000 people.7 The
other forty-nine states combined reduced it only by 38,000.8 This
is just to give you an outline about how this is not a story of largescale change happening everywhere.
What I want to emphasize in my talk today is that it’s not a
good thing that things are staying where they are, not only because of the human toll, not only because of the racial disparities
3. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 4, at 24–27.
4. Id. (manuscript ch. 5, at 33) “‘[B]usiness as usual’ in the United States
of 2020 has incorporated all practices, attitudes and expectations of the fivefold
expansion in rates of imprisonment.”).
5. Id. (manuscript ch. 1, at 14–15).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id. (manuscript ch. 9, at 11).
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and the disproportionate impact, but also because this is an abject failure if the goal is public safety, and if the goal is maximizing our limited resources in the best possible way.
I teach and write about criminal law and administrative
law, as Maria [Ponomarenko] pointed out, and I have always
been struck by the contrast between the two areas. In one space
where I teach and talk about things, we value expertise, we
value data, we do cost-benefit analysis, we make our policymakers explain why they’re doing what they’re doing, and they face
judicial review to make sure they’re not being arbitrary and capricious, and then in the other space, in criminal law, we just let
policymakers go with their gut.
You know the expression when you are in law school that
bad facts make bad law. Criminal law is basically writ large just
one example of that. We get policies that are the result of bad
facts that are on the news, or on social media,9 and they may feel
emotionally satisfying at the time to segments of our electorate,
who think that these policies are applying to the absolute worst
kinds of crimes that they are reading and hearing about. But, in
fact, these policies often make us less safe in the long term because of how difficult they make it for people to successfully
reenter after they’ve served their terms of confinement, because
of the hurdles we have set up.10
I think the way out of this is to recognize that we need to
make criminal justice administration look more like the rest of
administrative law. And I think Frank agrees. So, this is from a
draft, but Frank points out that a truly sophisticated administrative law of crime can lead to a parsimonious and humane penal system.11 Excessive punishment is evidence of, among other
things, bad management.12 I hope this stays in, Frank, because
I agree with it, and I think this key about bad management and
bad policies is really central for us to take a close look at because
I think that for far too long the rhetoric—the bill of goods that
have been sold to us—is that these are the policies we need to
9. Cf. Chelsea Jubitana, Behind Locked Bars: The Role of Media and Mass
Incarceration, KENAN INST. ETHICS DUKE U. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://kenan
.ethics.duke.edu/behind-locked-bars-the-role-of-media-and-mass-incarcerationmarch/ [https://perma.cc/SXN6-A8FT] (commenting on the role that the media
plays in the perception of mass incarceration in America).
10. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 9, at 11).
11. Id. (manuscript ch. 8, at 24).
12. Id.
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make us safer. That’s the tradeoff. You have to accept this human misery; you have to somehow accept these racial disparities. That’s the price for being safer and better off.13 And, in fact,
I think what we find when we dig deeper, and I am going to explain some of these today, is that they are actually not good policies if that’s the goal. They are failing in that effort.
Frank’s book focuses largely on incarceration, but there is a
host of surrounding policies as well that share this trait, that
seem to serve this retributive urge for harsher punishment but
ultimately represent in my view bad management. And in that I
mean that they are failing their goal if the goal is to make the
best use of our limited public resources. I am going to highlight
just a few resources from my book to give you a sense of what I
am talking about. The opening chapter explains a dynamic that
we have in criminal law in the United States which is that we
lump together people of really different levels of culpability and
we treat them all as if they are the worst possible offense in that
category.14 And there are lots of examples of this, but in the interests of time I’ll just give you a couple.
I’ll start with one that I think people have an intuitive sense
wouldn’t be like this—the category of sex offender. I think when
the average person thinks about that term of sex offender they
are probably thinking of people who commit violent acts of rape,
people who molest children. But if you look at the actual laws
that define who qualifies for being a sex offender you find they
sweep more broadly than that. There was a Human Rights
Watch [report], for example, that found five of the states require
you to go on a sex offender registry if you visited a prostitute.15
Thirteen states will put you on the registry if you urinated in
public.16 Twenty-nine states require registration for teenagers
who have consensual sex with another teenager.17
13. Cf. Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking Public Safety to Reduce Mass Incarceration and Strengthen Communities, MEDIUM (Aug. 20, 2019), https://medium
.com/@teamwarren/rethinking-public-safety-to-reduce-mass-incarceration-and
-strengthen-communities-90e8591c6255 [https://perma.cc/E6JW-ULG3] (“It’s a
false choice to suggest a tradeoff between safety and mass incarceration.”).
14. RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN
THE US 39 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907
webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJK8-FBJ4].
16. Id.
17. Id.
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I could give you examples of the kind of cases that are particularly demonstrative of how irrational these policies are. A
nine-year-old plays doctor with a six-year-old and ends up on the
registry.18 One elementary school child plays a prank on a classmate and pulls down the kids pants; on the registry.19 There are
not as many of those, but they are there. But, more critically,
what it is dominated by are teenagers who get on registries after
they sext with each other, after they send sexually-explicit photos of themselves to each other.
What is critical about this is that the sentencing and collateral consequences for people who are labeled as sex offenders are
not based in thinking about the totality of this category. They
are not thinking about the range of different people who are in
it. They are not thinking about children playing pranks or people
who go to people engaged in sex work or who are teenagers sending pictures to each other. They are set with the worst kinds of
crimes in this category in mind. What ends up happening is you
look around the country and what you find are very harsh mandatory minimum sentences. There are sex offender registration
requirements that are often quite severe—often putting people
on registries for life not to mention all kinds of bans on where
people can live and where they are allowed to go.
It’s not just true of this category of sex offender, it’s true of
a host of other categories and labels as well. You could look in
our laws and find this just about everywhere. One example is we
give collateral consequences to people who have felony convictions because they are all in the category of “felons.” That is a
really wide category of behaviors, and yet there are very harsh
treatments that apply to everybody who is in that category. We
sentence all drug traffickers, in many places, who deal in certain
quantities of a certain type of drug the same. Wherever they fall
on the drug trafficking hierarchy in their organization. It doesn’t
matter if they are a key manager versus someone who is just
selling to support a habit. Their sentence and their treatment is
largely driven by the quantity of the drugs and the type. Three
strikes laws, recidivist sentencing laws for people who have
18. See Abigail Pesta, The Accidental Sex Offender, MARIE CLAIRE (July 28,
2011), http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a6294/teen-sex-offender
[https://perma.cc/LTY4-XK48].
19. See Sarah Stillman, The List: When Juveniles Are Found Guilty of Sexual Misconduct, the Sex-Offender Registry Can Be a Life Sentence, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/when-kids
-are-accused-of-sex-crimes [https://perma.cc/7KBU-NKXL].
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repeat offenses, also tend to be these really broad categories of
people all lumped in together.
The key part of this dynamic is, when they are lumped in
like that, it’s not that the sentencing range or the treatment of
them reflects the wide variety; it’s very often the case that they
are all being treated as the worst among them. Now, this is disproportionate as a matter of retributive justice and thinking of
the punishment that people deserve for what they’ve done. But
what I want to emphasize is how pernicious it is for public safety,
and I think the tendency might be that people think, well, you
know, that maybe it’s disproportionate as a matter of justice but
if we give people longer sentences or we treat them more harshly,
so what? Don’t we get more deterrence that way? Isn’t it better
for public safety to do that? And what I want to point out is that
the research tells us otherwise.
For starters, we’ve known for a while that it matters far
more—for someone trying to decide if they are going to commit a
crime—whether or not they are going to get caught as opposed
to the sentence length that they face if they do. And, the assumption that more severe sentences are better also just focuses on
the period that someone is incarcerated. We think that while
someone is incarcerated they are incapacitated and they can’t
commit offenses outside of the facility they are held. We think
that’s a benefit. And it is.
But it’s important to weigh that benefit against what happens when people get out. And, it’s important here to note that
ninety-five percent of the people who are incarcerated rejoin all
of us.20 They are part of our communities. We would want to
know if their time incarcerated has an effect on them when they
come out. And I think there has been a conventional assumption
that, “Oh, it must be really great for that, because they are going
to be deterred from doing things again,” with not enough emphasis on, “what if their time while they were incarcerated actually
was harmful from a public safety perspective?” What if, in fact,
being in prison itself is criminogenic: if the environment is such
that it makes it harder for people to reenter.21
20. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 39 (2016) (citing Michael Mueller-Smith, The
Criminal Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration (2015) (working paper) (on file
with author)).
21. See, e.g., Scott D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, FED. BUREAU PRISONS &
NAT’L INST. JUST. Criminogenic Effects of Prison Environment on Inmate
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Being separated from their social networks and the people
that they love is actually harmful from a public safety goal.
There is an interesting study out of Texas that finds that after a
certain point in somebody’s sentence each additional year that
they serve causes a four to seven percent increase in their recidivism rate. That’s a really important fact, because it suggests
that there are these tipping points in long sentences where whatever benefit we were going to get from incapacitation is going to
get outweighed by the harms to reentry when people come back
out, from what those longer sentences are doing to them. And, if
you stop to think about it, it makes sense because longer sentences for starters means that there are more people in prison
and so there are fewer resources to go around for everyone.22 So,
there’s not enough programming for everyone.
It also ignores the fact that most people are going to age out
of their criminal behavior.23 I’ll leave that to our expert criminologists to give you further detail on, but we’ve known this for a
really long time.
We are putting people in prison and keeping them there long
past the point when they would have aged out of whatever criminal behavior they are engaged in. At a certain point, we have
incarceration reaching this sort of tipping point, and it is not going to be associated with a reduction in crime but an increase.
Now, I can’t tell you where that tipping point is, but I will tell
you that, during my time on the [United States] Sentencing
Commission, that’s what I asked every single criminologist and
data person that came before us, and no one is actually able to
pinpoint it. But a rational conversation about criminal justice
would recognize that it’s there and seek to balance these
tradeoffs between long sentences—that they’re just not a complete good for public safety—just the opposite, that in fact they
start to have just the opposite effect and make people less safe.
I will point to a couple of real-world examples of this, that
we do know about, where we have seen jurisdictions reduce their
sentences and that have not seen an increase in crime, which is
Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence (2004), https://www.bop.gov/resources/
research_projects/published_reports/cond_envir/camp_gaes_c&d.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BB5J-LHUB].
22. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch.4, at 7).
23. See, e.g., Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?: Why People Age
Out of Crime, and What it Could Mean for How Long We Put Them Away, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/
20/too-old-to-commit-crime [https://perma.cc/29GG-ZEGL].
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one empirical way that you can demonstrate this. One example
from my time on the Sentencing Commission is that we lowered
all drug sentences—all federal drug sentences in the United
States—by two levels in the guideline manual, which in practical
terms ends up being about twenty-five months on average for a
person.24 That’s a two-year reduction in sentence and we made
this retroactive. And that meant that more than 30,000 people
in federal prison were able to go before a judge and get their sentences reduced and were released early.
What is interesting about this decision is that we made it as
part of a bi-partisan sentencing commission with four Democrats
and three Republicans and we were unanimous. In this time in
America you might ask how could that be, how could you get a
unanimous decision out of four Democrats and three Republicans? And the reason is that we had data from when the Sentencing Commission had done this in the past. The Sentencing
Commission had reduced crack sentences in 2007—had lowered
them by two levels—and we were able to track what happened
to the people who got the reductions over a period of five years.
We could see whether it mattered that someone got their sentence reduced as compared to the people that served their full
sentence, because the reductions came too late for them to get
the benefit.
It was really nice because you could match people who were
similarly situated for offense and criminal history and the only
difference between them was that one group got this reduction
and one group didn’t. Five years later there was no statistically
significant difference in their recidivism rates. In fact, the group
that got the sentencing reductions had a lower rate. Looking at
that enabled the Sentencing Commission to say unanimously
that we can do this for all drugs and we can feel confident that
we can lower sentences without a cost to public safety.
States around the country have done similar things. We
have seen them reduce their sentences and their incarceration
rates without upticks in crime. And I am confident we can do far
more and not see an increase.
I want to spend a minute talking about how this relates to
pre-trial detention as well. There are about half a million
24. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Reduce Drug Trafficking Sentences (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www
.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-10-2014 [https://perma.cc/P3Y9
-LQQA].
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people—a little shy of half a million people—who find themselves incarcerated before they have been convicted of any offense.25 And, here too, we should ask: how does that work for
public safety, would that be a good thing or a bad thing? And
here, again, it’s just like the story with incarceration and people
sentenced after their conviction. If we stop for a minute and
think about what it means to be detained pre-trial, it means that
you are likely going to lose your job because your employer is not
really going to wait around because you have been put in jail.
You often lose your housing—you get evicted. You may lose your
children—custody of your children—because there’s no one to
take care of them while you are incarcerated. This is a completely life-altering event for people, even when it’s a short period of time.
When people have studied what does it mean to detain people pre-trial versus not, they have found that it increases recidivism risk.26 It’s a parallel story to the one that we see for people
who are sentenced after conviction, where they are more likely
to recidivate when they are released than the people who weren’t
detained and they control for criminal history and offence type.
The idea is that there is something about the pre-trial detention
itself, and they have found that that increase is true both for the
risk of more felonies and the risk of more misdemeanors—so this
is a risk of felony reoffending as well.
Here too, it’s just to point out there are costs to these policies
that I think are not part of our public discussion, because the
public discussion is always just around the person who is released pre-trial who commits a violent offense and someone asks
why they weren’t detained. Whose fault was that? Was that the
prosecutor? Was that the judge who screwed up, because surely
the person should have been detained? Then there’s often a push
in jurisdictions to change their entire set-up of pre-trial detention and their whole bail regime to avoid that one case that
makes it into the media. And what you don’t get is a discussion
of the flip side. There’s not the news story that says, wow, our
pre-trial detention policies dramatically increase the risk of
25. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie
2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/H55G-GVAT].
26. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 4 (2013), https://
craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden
-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHT7-PYAE].
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future crime because we are detaining too many people. Because
that’s not a news story. There are no statistical news stories. I
would watch that network but not many people would. And so,
as a result of that, we get a really jaded perspective on the costs
and benefits of detention, both after conviction and at pre-trial.
Another flaw in our approach is thinking about what happens to people while they are detained. When we think about
what makes them worse off, sometimes it’s just being separated
from social networks and people whom they love. But it’s also
that we don’t make investments in programming.27 This is a big
theme in Frank’s draft, and I believe will stay in the final book
too (this is the awkward part about talking about a book that is
not in its final form, but I feel confident it will stay in there as
well). It’s this idea that it’s really important to ask what happens
to people while they’re incarcerated, particularly if we’re not going to be reducing these populations any time soon.
It should be a real focus of our reform efforts to ask what we
are doing while they are incarcerated. About eighty-five percent
of the people who are incarcerated have a substance abuse problem. And yet, only about eleven percent of people get any treatment28 We see the same thing if we ask about other categories
like people with mental health needs and whether they are getting mental health treatment, or whether people are receiving
cognitive behavioral treatment, vocational training, or educational programming.29 These interventions are cost-benefit justified. They work.30 They are good investments. If they were on
my administrative law side of the ledger, they would all be upheld as good public policy interventions. But we are not doing
that and instead less than ten percent of people who are incarcerated are getting this kind of programming, even though these
would be good investments, and we would be saving far more
27. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1).
28. The NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA
UNIV., BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION
i–ii (2010), https://www.centeronaddiction.org/addiction-research/reports/
behind-bars-ii-substance-abuse-and-america%E2%80%99s-prison-population
[https://perma.cc/4WWM-UGVM].
29. See BARKOW, supra note 14, at 61–67.
30. See, e.g., Carolyn Zezima, Incarcerated with Mental Illness: How to Reduce the Number of People with Mental Health Issues in Prison, PSYCOM (Mar.
5, 2019), https://www.psycom.net/how-to-reduce-mental-illness-in-prisons
[https://perma.cc/HF6Q-KDZ3] (describing the successful Criminal Mental
Health Project implemented in Florida).
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money by making the investment because of what it would mean
for reduced recidivism later and lowering incarceration.
We also don’t do other things when it comes to confinement
that, as a public policy matter, would make sense. These aren’t
so much about programming, but are just about the way that
prisons operate. For example, we often put people far away from
their families and their support networks, but that’s a terrible
idea if our goal is public safety.31 We want them to be near their
communities, their families, the places where when they come
out, they are going to get jobs.
Putting them far away is a terrible public policy idea if that’s
our goal.
Similarly, we want them in a place where people can easily
visit, but we are making it hard for families, particularly families who are poor—they are disproportionately poor—and these
visits are tremendously difficult for people.32 We make phone
calls expensive even though that policy is terrible as a public policy matter.33 We would want calls frankly to be free, because
keeping people connected is really valuable.
We might ask, well, if these are all such great ideas, why
aren’t we doing them? One reason is that prisons are not held
accountable for any of the outcomes that happen after people
leave their custody.34 We are not evaluating them and asking
how did things work for the incarcerated person while they were
with you? And then what happens to people later? When prisons
are doing their own cost-benefit analysis, that is not a key part
of what they are focused on.
When they are thinking about prison phone calls, they are
thinking of, one, they can actually make a fair amount of money
from their cut of charging people for calls and, two, they don’t
like some of the calls—you know not all of the calls are good calls.
31. See William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the
Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 287, 304–05 (2008).
32. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Separation by Bars and Miles:
Visitation in State Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 20, 2015), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/prisonvisits.html [https://perma.cc/9RZN-KN5F].
33. See Wendy Sawyer, Why Expensive Phone Calls Can Be Life-Altering
for People in Jail – and Can Derail the Justice Process, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/05/jail-phone-calls/
[https://perma.cc/X2FX-GBED].
34. See Daniel Mears, Accountability, Efficiency, and Effectiveness in Corrections: Shining a Light on the Black Box of Prison Systems, 7 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008).
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Some of the calls could be calls to engage in criminal activity, so
they have to monitor those. They have to have a mechanism in
place to monitor them.
But prisons only focus on those things when they are making their policies, and they are not thinking about this tradeoff
which is good for the rest of us—that is good for the public—because, on net, charging people for calls does nothing to help with
the monitoring—it just means that there are fewer calls, but it
doesn’t mean that people that can somehow afford to pay for
them are less dangerous than people who can’t.
It’s also the case that, when prisons and prison officials are
making decisions about other things within their four walls, they
are really focused on the here and now for them. And it’s not that
they are engaging in bad faith—and I’m not suggesting that—I
think this is just basic human behavior. If someone is misbehaving in front of them, and they think that solitary confinement is
a basic disciplinary tool that they want to use because it helps
them maintain order at the moment, they are going to think
about that. They are not going to be thinking about the fact that
putting someone in solitary confinement—in addition to being
indescribably cruel, does damage that lasts when they come back
out and so it’s very hard from a readjustment perspective. But
again, the official may not be balancing that out.
When we think about a setup like that, that doesn’t hold
prisons and their administration accountable for how their policies affect people when they come back out and rejoin society, we
shouldn’t really be surprised that they’re not focused on it and
that we have really abysmal recidivism rates for people when
they come out of prison. More than seventy percent of those who
are released have new arrests or convictions within five years
after they come out.35 I don’t think we should expect much different outcomes if we’re not evaluating prisons to try to get those
rates lower and to try to have that be a more positive intervention.
Now the reason that doesn’t happen is I think there is a tendency in our society to just blame the person. That is, there is a
tendency to assume it is not the prison’s fault, that it is the fault
of the individual who comes out and decides to commit a new
crime or who comes out and decides to keep taking drugs. And,
if we see this as just a problem of personal responsibility, we
35. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM
2005–2010 (2014).
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never ask how prisons are doing, because we just think they are
places that individuals will go and come back out and it’s all on
the individual. But that is a pretty strange way to view a massive government program of intervention. If you think about government programs, you would be hard pressed to find many bigger than our use of prisons and jails. This is a massive
government intervention on an enormous scale, and we should
be asking for government accountability. Are you doing a good
job when you’re doing this? Are you making things better? Are
you making things worse?
I think you know we have gone away from that, because, in
part, of this turn away from seeing the notion of rehabilitation
as possibly being something that could happen. I think that is
definitely something that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, this
idea that, well, things aren’t working very well. The interventions aren’t working very well, and then that led to policy
changes that reflected the sentiment that really nothing works
to rehabilitate. What you end up with is a focus on facilities that
are really just warehousing people.
It has other effects as well. It leads to this idea not to ask
what are the interventions in prison, but it also means that we
lose a lot of the second looks at people themselves over time. Because if you don’t think that people can change—if you don’t
think that’s possible—then you don’t need to look at them as
time passes and ask if they have. That also explains why we have
seen a decline in parole, why we have seen a decline in clemency
and other second-look mechanisms.
I’ll give you one example of that, which proves this point
pretty well. There was a lot of talk about President Obama’s
clemency grants, which I was quite grateful for—that he granted
as many people clemency as he did. But, if you look at what he
did in historical perspective, what you notice is his overall grant
rate didn’t even exceed Ronald Reagan. And, President Nixon
had more commutations than President Obama did.36 So, although he talked about having numbers—clemency commutation
numbers—that were higher than other presidents, actually his
rate was fairly low. And you see that when you see how many

36. Rachel Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 387, 437 (2017).
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people he denied, which is more denials than any modern president by a mile.37
Now is that because you needed to deny more people because
the overall population of those incarcerated was somehow worse?
I would argue just the opposite. We had expanded it so much to
cover people who had committed drug offenses and who were
there serving mandatory minimums where the judge really was
not able to give the sentence that they wanted. If anything, the
rate should have gone up. But I think part of this is just this
political environment—that it’s risky for any executive to give
clemency because they too don’t want that bad news story—the
one case going awry. It is a common theme in criminal justice.
Now, in administrative law, we don’t do that. We are not
supposed to do that. We are supposed to rationally say, okay, the
vaccine has this rare outcome in some cases but overall there are
enormous public health benefits. The same with air travel: there
may be an accident, but overall it is enormously beneficial for
society, and so we try to figure out how to minimize risk while
keeping the overall approach, which we know to be beneficial.
But, in criminal law, we don’t do that kind of balancing. We
let the outlier case drive what we do. Weirdly, it means that
criminal law ends up being oddly frozen in time as well, because
we make these decisions about people and sometimes we give
them decades-long sentences—thirty years, twenty years—and
don’t reevaluate them even though it would defy everything we
know about human nature to think that those people and their
attitudes may not have changed. Or, for example, to assume that
we as a society may not have changed how we view particular
crimes. If you even just think about the changes in the perspective on marijuana over the years, I think it becomes obvious that
you want to take second looks at things and reevaluate. But we
have created an environment in many jurisdictions in the United
States where that just isn’t in the cards for folks. There is not
going to be a second look. Even though we might have an initial
panic over a kind of crime, we put the policy in place, and we
don’t get to revisit it. The politics of this make it very hard to do
that.

37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE 2014 CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 2 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170901_
clemency.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH4E-CMYD].
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We’ve seen parole either disappear or decline dramatically
in jurisdictions because of single cases of a parolee committing
an offense.38 We’ve seen the decline in clemency, in good time
credits that people can earn while they’re incarcerated, compassionate release, and retroactive adjustments.39 Just to give you
historical perspective, it wasn’t always like this in America. We
had seventy percent release rates for people on parole in the
United States as recently as the 1970s.40 Clemency was a routine
thing that governors and the president had given before parole
came on the stage to essentially replace it. So, between the two
of them, we were actually giving lots of second looks in our system.
One more example that I want to give you is collateral consequences because I think you will see the same dynamic there
as well. There are upwards of 47,000 collateral consequences for
people who have committed crimes, and they range from making
it more difficult for people to get housing and licenses to restrictions on voting.41 There are about nineteen million people
who have been convicted of felonies in America so these are affecting an awful lot of people.42 And I just want to focus on the
fact of how so many of these things make it very difficult for people to successfully rejoin after serving terms of incarceration and
stay on a path of law-abiding behavior.
Take housing. Housing is a crucial need for people who are
released from prison. A third of the people who are released from
prison are homeless within six months and yet Congress has
passed very strict bans on access to public housing. Some of the
harshest target people who are engaged in drug trafficking.43 So,
if someone in your household is selling or using drugs, even if
they are not doing it in the public housing itself, they are just

38. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., MAX OUT: THE RISE IN PRISON INMATES REWITHOUT SUPERVISION 2 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/
assets/2014/06/04/maxout_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6RA-RDVA].
39. BARKOW, supra note 14, at 78–87.
40. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 19 (2001), https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesI/nij/189106-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7HB-PDPV].
41. Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 307–09 (2015).
42. Id. at 328.
43. Bruce Western et al., Stress and Hardship After Prison, 120 AM. J. SOC.
1512, 1526 (2015).
LEASED
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doing it some place, your whole household can be evicted.44
Think about how hard it is to stay on a law-abiding path when
you don’t have a home, how much more difficult is it to go get a
job. It makes everything harder.
Similarly, Congress, when it ended welfare as we know it in
1996, said to states that they had to impose lifetime bans on people with drug-related felony convictions from either getting federal welfare aid or food stamps.45 Now, states can opt out of this.
They can opt out of the lifetime ban and some have done so, but
people with a felony drug conviction in America are still fully or
partially excluded from food stamp benefits in thirty states and
in thirty-six states from welfare assistance.46 Again, this is transitional aid that really helps people make the transition into employment, but it’s setting up a hurdle in their way.
Congress also created additional incentives for states to create more collateral consequences. It passed a law that said states
would lose ten percent of their federal highway dollars unless
the state passed laws to revoke or suspend driver’s licenses of
people who had been convicted of drug felonies.47 Here too, some
of the states have decided the money is not worth it. But there
are still eighteen jurisdictions, which account for forty-eight percent of our country’s residents, with a ban on a driver’s license if
you have this drug felony conviction.48
In a majority of these jurisdictions, there are no more than
two percent of workers who are able to rely on public trans-

44. 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2018) (allowing public housing landlords to terminate housing for “any household with a member” who is determined to be
using a controlled substance).
45. Id. § 862(a).
46. Rebecca Beitsch, States Rethink Restrictions on Food Stamps, Welfare
for Drug Felons, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jul. 30, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts
.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/07/30/states-rethink
-restrictions-on-food-stamps-welfare-for-drug-felons [https://perma.cc/QBW7
-GPSZ].
47. 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2018).
48. Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: How Driver’s License Suspensions for Drug Offenders Unrelated to Driving Are Falling Out of Favor,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national
.html [https://perma.cc/6MGE-5Q3L]; Molly Davis, Driver Licenses to No Longer
Be Suspended for Drug Users, LIBERTAS INST. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://
libertasutah.org/2018-bills/driver-licenses-to-no-longer-be-suspended-for-drug
-users [https://perma.cc/F4H3-UC3F].
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portation to get to work.49 Think about what the situation is for
these folks: they have to decide whether they are they going to
drive on a suspended license—there’s no public transportation
option—to get to work. What are they going to do?
We are making it really, really difficult for people to reenter
society and make transitions to law-abiding behaviors. And,
again, we are lumping all kinds of people together for these collateral consequences. There are many, many examples of these.
I just wanted to give you a flavor of some of them.
The next key question is why do we end up with this result?
I have already alluded to some of the political dynamics that create this. This system is really not the outcome of rational reflection, but dysfunctional politics. And, as Frank notes in his draft,
the cumulative effect of this is that we end up with mass incarceration.50 When we look at how this all happens, I think that
one of the really important themes in his book is this idea that
it’s not that there was one central planner that did this. Instead,
we have lots of pockets of discretion in American criminal policymaking.51 Prosecutors have discretion, judges often have discretion, governors, presidents to exercise clemency, parole officials—lots of actors with discretion. What’s interesting is how
basically the political climate creates a situation where those actors choose to exercise their discretion in a way that leads to
enormous punitive consequences for people and, particularly, to
prison.52 Because Frank’s book notes that it’s not that we see a
general trend of creating new crimes or new maximum or minimum punishments. Instead, it’s this dynamic of how people are
letting politics affect their exercise of discretion.53
So, what does that? What creates that kind of political environment that leads people to do this? We do have a political process that is focused on particular stories that get a lot of attention in the media. And if you study what the media covers you
find there’s a pretty steady drumbeat of offenses involving the
most violent cases that make people really angry. Or they’ll talk
49. See ADIE TOMER ET AL., METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKMISSED OPPORTUNITY: TRANSIT AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA
(2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0512_jobs_
transit.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY4J-S4X7].
50. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 1).
51. Id.
52. Id. (manuscript ch. 3).
53. Id. (manuscript ch. 8).
INGS,
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about sentencing—it’s a focus on sentences that are too lenient—
so that people get upset about that. Politicians know that’s
what’s being portrayed. They also know that they can drum up
support for themselves and get attention if they point out that
there’s things that people are afraid of or that make people angry.54
And, in addition to the fact that elected officials do this, we
now have a group of people that have a stake in keeping punishment the way that it is.55 A financial stake for some because they
are bail bondsmen and they don’t want to lose the ability to continue to have their industry operate if there is pre-trial detention
reform or if they make money off of prison phone calls. Or, if they
have a professional interest that’s maybe not strictly speaking
financial, but it makes their job easier to have certain policies in
place, which is certainly true, for example, for prosecutors whose
jobs are tremendously easier if they have mandatory minimums
to threaten people with and longer sentences if someone were to
decide to exercise their trial right. So, you have all those folks
with a stake in maintaining punitive practices because of how
helpful they are in doing their jobs.
That creates a dynamic that makes it very hard to dismantle
because it gives everyone the incentive to keep things how they
are. And it all starts from a public mood that sentences are too
lenient, because they are thinking about the cases that they’re
seeing. There is information in Frank’s book that talks a lot
about this, that there are people who have this view that sentences are too lenient.56 There are studies that show this view is
not tied to people who live in areas that have high rates of
crime.57 So, the sentiment is not related to higher crime rates to
explain some of the things we are seeing. Instead, they just have
a general sensibility, which I do think comes in part from how
things get covered in the media. This mood that things are too
lenient and how people view sentencing doesn’t vary even while
crime rates do.58

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. (manuscript ch. 3).
See id. (manuscript ch. 4).
Id. (manuscript ch. 8, at 15).
E.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND PUBLIC
OPINION: A SUMMARY OF RECENT STUDIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SENTENCING POLICY (2001), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/sl_crimepunish_
publicopinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LBU-EYMR].
58. See id. at 1.

2020]

KEYNOTE TRANSCRIPT

2643

It’s not the case that the public mood is tracking crime rates
nor is it the case that our incarceration boom is tracking crime
rates. The incarceration boom may track this popular perception
that things are too lenient and all these groups that want to have
harsher sentences, but that is also not tracking crime rates. So,
it is not the case that this is tied together in that way. Instead,
there’s a political dynamic that’s working here about how people
are thinking about crime, even if it’s not borne out by actual statistics.
Frank’s book reminds us that it’s not just the public that
thinks sentences are too lenient. He points out that the group of
people who go into prosecution and law enforcement really have
strong views on where sentences are, and that matters for a few
reasons.59 One is that it’s really important to know that your district attorneys—people who are prosecutors—are really critical
lobbyists for punishment policies in America. Their thumbprints
are everywhere when you look at almost any law that affects
criminal punishment. They, either directly as a district attorney
or part of a lobbying association of district attorneys, are almost
always in opposition to any kind of sentencing reform.
We are seeing it play out right now in New York where we
passed bail reform, which is going to kick in in January [2020].60
And they are sounding the alarms all over the place about how
bad this is going to be. They have no data, but they are talking
about individual cases. They are using anecdotes. They are using
the same playbill that I’m sure you all know well. I’ll give you an
example, not from New York, but it’s one of my favorites. This if
from a district attorney in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania,
who, as it turns out, had his own misbehavior, but before that
happened and he got into trouble of his own, he was pushing for
longer sentences for people who were selling heroin. He wanted
to have much higher sentences in state prison, especially for repeat offenders, and he advocated for this. And now I’m going to
quote him; I like this quote because it is so honest. He said, “I’m
pissed off. And we need to do something about it.”61
59. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8).
60. See Elizabeth Janowski, New York Bail Changes Set to Take Effect in
January Despite Late Swell of Opposition, NBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/new-york-bail-changes-set
-take-effect-january-despite-late-n1099326 [https://perma.cc/YJ5A-MJHA].
61. Caitlin Sinett, ‘I’m Pissed Off,’ Lancaster County D.A. Taking a Stand
Against Heroin Dealers, FOX 43 (June 7, 2016, 4:56 PM), https://www.fox43.com/
article/news/local/contests/im-pissed-off-lancaster-county-d-a-taking-a-stand
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I actually think that’s one of the more honest sentiments
about how we ended up with where we are. If someone’s pissed
off, they think something’s too lenient, they are mad about a
crime they have just heard about, and they think we need to do
something about it. And the something is a longer sentence; it’s
an expansion of some collateral consequence, and it makes it
seem like they are doing something about the problem, and no
one is bothering to ask: Does that something work? Is that the
best thing we could do? And, in many cases, it’s not, and it ends
up being ineffectual, but it creates a political environment where
it’s very hard to be on the other side of this.
What you end up seeing from this political environment is
that our institutional backgrounds and structures in the United
States have changed over the decades, because. Although a lot of
this was sparked by an initial rise in violent crime and a legitimate concern of people that we ought to do things differently,
you know what I think is valuable—among many of the valuable
things in Frank’s book—is kind of how that then takes on a life
of its own. You initially respond to an incidence of higher violent
crime rates in the 1970s, for example, and 1980s, but you create
all kinds of institutional changes as a result that long outlast
why you created them in the first place.62 And then they are very
hard to undo.
One of the things that ended up happening is that we had
doctrinal changes that led to a decline in jury trials; that the Supreme Court says it’s okay for prosecutors to threaten people
with really long sentences if they go to trial and exercise their
jury trial right.63 People weren’t sure the Supreme Court was
going to say that was okay. It had been done, but it had been
done on the down-low. Once the Supreme Court comes out and
says that’s okay, that diminishes the power of the jury. As does
having more mandatory minimum sentences which makes it
easier for prosecutors to say either plead guilty now or I’m going
to charge you with this crime that has a mandatory minimum
attached and then you will, if you are convicted, get ten years,
twenty years, thirty years, life. Similarly, the increase of pretrial detention means that people will plead to get out of jail—
-against-heroin-dealers/521-bb0f4410-beae-421c-ba9e-7388b79cf39a [https://
perma.cc/7LWY-6QKA].
62. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3).
63. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 743–44 (1970).
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they just want to get out, so they will plead and take time
served.64
You really see a decline in the jury as a result of these factors changing. We talked about the decline in clemency and parole—these second looks that take place. And we also really see
far less court oversight. In part that is because of mandatory
sentences that make it difficult for judges, in part because of
some changes to the bench itself that I want to talk about. What
you see are institutional changes that are really critical to pay
attention to, because if you are going to dismantle this you need
to think about these institutional dynamics and how you’re going
to undo them.
And, in addition to that, I think you also need to think about
money. Some of the themes in Frank’s book talk about this, this
kind of insidious momentum as he describes it, of mass incarceration. So, we invested money in things: we hired more district
attorneys, ADAs, more assistant prosecutors, and more law enforcement agents. Now, they are in place, and they have to do
something, because they are there. When you build more prisons, you fill them, and it’s very hard to close them, and it’s very
hard to lower the number of people who work in these jobs.65
Those are really important changes that create a vested stake in
keeping things as they are because people’s livelihoods depend
upon it.
In addition to that, to thinking about how law enforcement
budgets have ballooned, Frank’s book reminds us that it has created an environment and a culture where the measure of success
for folks can be these long sentences. For prosecutors that’s a
badge showing that they have been good at their job. So we need
to think culturally how that gets dismantled, because if that’s
the measure by which people are judging themselves then we
would have to figure out what other measures could be used instead that may be better.
Again, think about the costs of how expensive incarceration
is. Your local district attorney, when they put somebody in state
prison, that doesn’t cost them very much money because they
don’t have to pay for it. And so it’s a free resource that as Frank
64. Cf. Hamilton Nolan, Study: Pretrial Detention Makes Poor People Plead
Guilty, SPLINTER (Jan. 26, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://splinternews.com/study
-pretrial-detention-makes-poor-people-plead-guilt-1822448614 [https://perma
.cc/ACE4-KYGV].
65. See ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3).
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and his co-author had talked about before, amounts to a correctional free lunch.66 It creates financial disincentives for reform.
In the time that I have left, I am going to quickly go through
three pillars of reform that try to dismantle this institutional dynamic that I think are critical.
I want to start with prosecutors. They are actors who use
their discretion to increase incarceration and so one corrective is
to think about how to rein that in. There’s a host of things that
we could be doing on that score. One is thinking about the way
in which they use pre-trial detention as a leverage point for
themselves, and cash bail is often a big part of that. We can eliminate cash bail without any effects on public safety—it’s just penalizing people who are poor. We could dramatically lower pretrial detention, and that has an enormous effect on prosecutors’
ability to leverage pleas. We could also eliminate mandatory
minimums. So these are some policy things that are not only
good policies in their own right, but they really do affect the leverage that prosecutors have. Open file discovery and second
looks are also on that list.
But I think it’s also important to focus on how you go about
doing that—how you get that—and we are seeing a movement
around the country to elect more progressive prosecutors.67
And here, I will just say that and I’m happy to talk more
about this in response to questions because my time is running
out. When we are thinking about what it actually means for
someone to be progressive, if your goal is actually to have a prosecutor who is focused on data and evidence and what actually
works to reduce crimes, then they should be out there on the
front lines advocating and lobbying for these changes even when
it’s against what might be the professional interest in making
their job easier. They should be guardians of public safety more
broadly and advocating for exactly these reforms that I am talking about.
There are other things that they could be doing as well, and
I am happy to talk about that more when we get to questions if
you have them, but one of them is also making them internalize
the costs of incarceration, creating financial incentives so when
66. Id. at 26 (“Adversarial pressures step on the prosecutorial gas pedal.
The correctional free lunch means that nobody puts on the brakes.”).
67. See Daniel A. Medina, The Progressive Prosecutors Blazing a New Path
for the US Justice System, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/us-justice-system-progressive
-prosecutors-mass-incarceration-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/EF7Y-Z6CT].
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they are deciding to send people to prison it’s just not completely
free for them. So, either financial incentives to give them rewards when they don’t or penalize them when they do.
The second key reform and area of institutional change really does get at this idea of using the agency model. Because really prosecutors can’t go it alone here, even the most progressive
ones. They are not responsible for this whole category of criminal
justice policies, and we do need people who take a coordinated
approach to things. This is not a problem unique to criminal justice. This is a problem that is true across regulatory spaces and
areas when we regulate health and safety. What we want is to
make sure that we have people who are looking at the best evidence we have and doing the best they can with the information
available to us. If we think about using an agency model, we can
use that as a potential path forward. They could study incarceration policies, things like visitation policies, things like where
people are confined, collateral consequences, second look mechanisms, and give us the best that we know on our existing
knowledge.
Frank talks about using the agency model in his book as
well. He talks about sentencing commissions as places that have
done some good particularly when they have been limited by capacity constraints because those capacity constraints are very
helpful in using limited resources. If you have to build additional
prisons as a result of a policy change, then maybe we shouldn’t
do it given the cost.68 Maybe we should find a way to think about,
are there different policies we could pursue that don’t cost as
much. For example, Frank highlights, and many of us as well,
the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, an administrative
agency that has done a pretty good job in terms of using its ability to rationalize resources as a potential model.69 I agree with
that. I think the experience with sentencing commissions in the
states backs this up.
Not all of them are great but on net they have actually done
quite well. Sentencing commissions have gotten a bad rap because of the one that I worked for. And I totally get that, because
that is true and it is important to ask why that sentencing commission was particularly bad and why the others have done better. And so, when we are thinking about using sentencing commissions or using agencies, it’s important to take the best
68. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 3).
69. Id.

2648

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2625

agencies that we’ve had using criminal justice policies, as opposed to looking at the worst and deciding it can’t work at all.
States with sentencing commissions have slowed the growth in
corrections spending in their states and have saved money. And
they have slowed the growth in incarceration. So this is a model
that can work and we’ve learned some lessons from those commissions of how they can be designed. That’s the key. You need
to design these agencies to reflect the political environment in
which they work, which means that they really do need to have
kind of these capacity constraints built into their operation.
Frankly, they need to look more like other administrative agencies that have to explain why they are doing what they are doing
to courts, so that it’s not just all politics, so you actually have
policymaking that’s not arbitrary and capricious.
I could say lots more about the agency model, but I want to
be sensitive to the time and get to my third category of things,
which is I want to bring the courts back into the conversation.
When we think about what sparks change in American society,
certainly it could be this movement to elect progressive prosecutors. That’s good, certainly, to the extent that there is a movement for criminal justice reform, I hope it’s used to have some of
these agencies put in place because I think that’s the kind of long
term thing we need. But the other thing that can spark change
is a court decision. When our courts protect constitutional values, that’s actually critically important. The Supreme Court did
this. California’s reforms would have never gotten underway at
all if it weren’t for a Supreme Court decision in Plata that held
that their prisons were unconstitutionally overcrowded.70
If we think about the two biggest reasons for incarceration
drops—the biggest incarceration drops—one was the U.S. sentencing commission. Thirty thousand people being let out of federal prison early is a big one.71 The other is the enormous drop
in California, and it was sparked by a court decision. So, we see
both the importance of an agency and we see the importance of
a court. But Plata, and I cannot emphasize this enough, was an
outlier Supreme Court decision. By and large, the Supreme
Court has done nothing to check mass incarceration, and in fact
it has done nothing even though there are doctrinal areas where
it should be doing more.
70. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2010).
71. See Justin Worland, What Happened When California Released 30,000
Prisoners, TIME (Oct. 7, 2015), https://time.com/4065359/california-prison
-release-department-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/XVU7-F5SS].
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We do, in fact, have an Eighth Amendment that bans cruel
and unusual punishments, but the Supreme Court has done very
little outside the death penalty to police it. It has created immunity doctrines for police and prosecutors out of whole cloth
that are not to be found in the text of anything. It has failed to
enforce the fact that you should not be imprisoned in America
because you are too poor to pay. And federal courts around the
country, unfortunately, are failing to enforce that protection so
people are being incarcerated because of fines and fees that they
have not paid.
When we think about why might that be, why do we have a
bench that hasn’t done more, I want to emphasize the fact of
who’s on it: lots of former prosecutors. And this is something I
didn’t need to limit to the bench by the way—we have former
prosecutors kind of dominating public life. They run for office,
they are governors and legislators. But I do want to focus on the
fact that they are judges in disproportionate amounts. So, if you
look at the federal bench, it is really an enormous number of people on the federal bench who have previously served as prosecutors. And, as compared to people who did public defense work,
it’s a four-to-one ratio.72
And this imbalance persisted even under President Obama
who claimed to be very interested in criminal justice reform. Before he took office, forty-three percent of the judges were prosecutors and ten percent had public defense experience.73 After his
eight years, forty-one percent had prosecution experience and
fourteen percent had public defense experience.74 So, the needle
was moved only slightly. I was recently at an event at NYU that
Judge Restrepo of the Third Circuit was at on this topic, and he
did some of his own counting. He found that we have had nineteen Supreme Court justices with prosecution experience and
zero with public defense. Of the 163 active circuit judges in the
United States (these are appellate), fifty-seven were former prosecutors, five were public defenders. If you look at state courts,
it’s similar. States with elected Supreme Court justices, thirtynine percent were former prosecutors, eight percent former defenders.75 You might think it’s better in states that appoint their
72. Barkow & Osler, supra note 36, at 472.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on
State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2009); Casey Tolan,
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justices. In appointed jurisdictions, fifty-three percent were former prosecutors, and three percent were former defenders. In
addition, CATO did a study of judges on the federal bench and
asked what the numbers looked like if you didn’t even limit yourself just to criminal prosecution on the government side—so including government-side civil enforcers. And when you do that,
it’s a seven-to-one ratio in favor of people who worked for the
government.
I think that’s really important. I think it’s really important
to ask if it’s healthy to have a bench that’s this imbalanced when
their role is to check the government, their role is to help check
the government against individual abuse. I think it’s really important to have more people on the bench who have spent careers
representing individuals against the government and protecting
individual liberties. I think it should be a critical path for reform,
that we think about this imbalance on both the federal and the
state bench. I think it’s part of Frank’s point about actors with
discretion, and I think courts are a big part of that. These folks
have a lot of discretion, and I think people who are interested in
criminal justice reform who are focused on prosecutors should in
addition really think about judges as well. And so those are my
big three institutional pillars. I will stop there, and I think there
is time for questions.

Why Federal Defenders Are Less Likely to Become Judges — and Why That Matters, SPLINTER (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://splinternews.com/why-public
-defenders-are-less-likely-to-become-judges-a-1793855687 [https://perma.cc/
Z9VF-D536].

